Since the 2001 recession, average core in ‡ation has been below the Federal Reserve's 2% target. This de ‡ationary bias is a predictable consequence of a low nominal interest rates environment in which the central bank follows a symmetric strategy to stabilize in ‡ation. The de ‡ationary bias increases if macroeconomic uncertainty rises or the natural real interest rate falls. An asymmetric rule according to which the central bank responds less aggressively to above-target in ‡ation corrects the bias and allows in ‡ation to converge to the central bank's target. We show that adopting this asymmetric rule improves welfare and reduces the risk of self-ful…lling de ‡ationary spirals. This approach does not entail any history dependence in setting the policy rate or any commitment to overshoot in ‡ation after periods in which the lower bound constraint was binding.
Introduction
Since the 2001 recession, core in ‡ation has been on average below the Federal Reserve's implicit 2% target. This phenomenon has become even more severe in the aftermath of the 2008 recession. In other words, the "conquest of US in ‡ation"that started with the Volcker disin ‡ation seems to have gone too far. In ‡ation, instead of stabilizing around the desired 2% in ‡ation target, has kept falling down. This de ‡ationary bias is a predictable consequence of a low nominal interest rate environment. We argue that a low in ‡ation target should be combined with an asymmetric policy rule that allows persistent deviations of in ‡ation above the central bank's target. Figure 1 provides evidence for the stylized fact that we are interested in. The yearto-year PCE core in ‡ation is reported with its ten-year moving average. In the early 1990s in ‡ation was still well above 2%. By the end of the same decade, the Federal Reserve had completed the long process that had started with the Volcker disin ‡ation. Around this time the Federal Reserve started discussing the possibility of moving to an explicit in ‡ation targeting regime. While an explicit 2% target was only announced on 25 January 2012 by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, the existence of an implicit 2% target predates this historical shift. 1 However, as the graph illustrates, in ‡ation has not stabilized around the desired target, instead it has kept on falling. As of today, the ten-year moving average is around 1.6%. Importantly, a similar picture emerges even when removing the 2001 and 2008 recessions. Furthermore, surveybased measures of long-term in ‡ation expectations also declined in recent years. The University of Michigan's survey-based expectations on in ‡ation …ve to ten years out has fallen by 80 basis points since the 2007. The survey of professional forecasters' ten-year-ahead expectations on CPI in ‡ation has followed a similarly declining pattern since 2012.
The de ‡ationary bias poses a serious challenge to the central bank. For instance, it may entail a considerable reputation loss if the private sector loses con…dence in the Federal Reserve's ability to bring in ‡ation back to target in an expansion. This outcome may be very costly as it could impair the central bank's capability to credibly commit to future actions, which is particularly critical to stimulate the economy when the current interest rate is at its zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint (Krugman 1998; and Eggertsson and Woodford 2003) . Furthermore, a prolonged period of low in ‡ation might cast doubts about whether or not the Federal Reserve is in fact committed to a symmetric 2% in ‡ation target, as opposed to a two-percent ceiling on the in ‡ation rate.
The interaction of the following two factors explains the de ‡ationary bias: (i) the remarkably low long-run nominal interest rates and (ii) the perfect symmetry of the current monetary policy framework, which treats positive and negative deviations of in ‡ation from the central bank's target on equal footing. We formalize our argument using a standard non-linear New Keynesian model, which we use to show that in the absence of either one of these two factors the bias would have not emerged.
When the long-run nominal interest rate is calibrated to the low values that seem plausible today, the model predicts that average in ‡ation will remain below target even during expansions. Forward-looking price setters anticipate that in case of a large negative shock the central bank will be unable to fully stabilize in ‡ation due to the ZLB constraint on nominal rates. These beliefs bring about de ‡ationary pressures and depress in ‡ation dynamics even when the economy is away from the ZLB. All changes in the macroeconomic environment that make ZLB episodes more likely or more persistent also cause the de ‡ationary bias to become more severe. Thus, a decline in the longterm real interest rate raises the probability of hitting the ZLB in the future and consequently makes the de ‡ationary bias larger. Similarly, heightened macroeconomic uncertainty also causes or prolongs the ZLB and, hence, contributes to exacerbating the de ‡ationary bias.
We argue that the symmetric approach to in ‡ation stabilization, which is currently followed by the Federal Reserve, loses e¢ cacy when the long-run nominal interest rate is low because it contributes to the formation of the de ‡ationary bias. An example of the Federal Reserve's symmetric interpretation of its in ‡ation objective is in the Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, which maintains: "The Committee would be concerned if in ‡ation were running persistently above or below this objective. Communicating this symmetric in ‡ation goal clearly to the public helps keep longer-term in ‡ation expectations …rmly anchored [. . . ] ". We show that in the current low interest rate environment, it is advantageous for the Federal Reserve to be more concerned about in ‡ation running below target than about in ‡ation going above target.
The central bank can remove the de ‡ationary bias and can raise social welfare by committing to adjust the policy rate less aggressively when in ‡ation is above target than when in ‡ation is below target. By removing the de ‡ationary bias, this asymmetric strategy raises the long-term in ‡ation expectations and hence makes self-ful…lling de ‡ationary spirals less likely to happen. These de ‡ationary spirals represent a pathological situation in which in ‡ation may keep falling indeterminately. This asymmetric strategy removes the de ‡ationary bias because it raises the risk of in ‡ation on the upside and, in doing so, o¤sets the downside risk due to the ZLB. Thus, an apparent paradox emerges: In order to interpret its in ‡ation target as symmetric, the central bank should follow an asymmetric strategy. The paradox is only apparent, because the asymmetric strategy corrects for the constraint represented by the ZLB. Of course, in practice, it may not be so easy for the central bank to convince agents that it has adopted an asymmetric rule. When in ‡ation is below target, announcing to be less aggressive in countering future upswings in in ‡ation is time inconsistent. 2 In this context, the central bank can conduct an opportunistic re ‡ation to demonstrate its commitment to the asymmetric strategy. 3 To conduct an opportunistic re ‡ation, the central bank announces the adoption of the asymmetric rule in the aftermath of a shock that pushes in ‡ation above target. Even though this action leads to a higher in ‡ation rate in the short run, which entails a welfare loss, this rise in in ‡ation o¤ers the central bank the opportunity to show the public that the central bank is now committed to follow the asymmetric strategy, which raises welfare in the long-run by removing the de ‡ationary bias. 4 We show that in our calibrated model opportunistic re ‡ation improves welfare. Nevertheless, if the realized magnitude of the in ‡ationary shock is big, this opportunistic move might give rise to a too high rate of in ‡ation in the short run and hence might lower welfare compared to sticking to the symmetric rule. However, according to our model, the size of the shock has to be implausibly large for this to be a real concern.
If no opportunity to re ‡ate the economy materializes, the central bank can cut the federal funds rate more aggressively when in ‡ation is below target. If the central bank is understood to keep responding with the same strength as in the past when in ‡ation will go above target, this action is shown to remove the de ‡ationary bias. Interestingly, we …nd that cutting the federal funds rate more aggressively when in ‡ation is below target turns out to reduce the risk of hitting the ZLB. This happens because the correction of the de ‡ationary bias ends up raising the long-term nominal interest rate and hence the room for the central bank to respond to recessionary shocks.
We derive all our results in a prototypical New Keynesian model that features the zero lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates. We solve the model with global methods to take into account the non-linearity represented by the zero lower bound. We show that other non-linearities such as precautionary savings do not play an important role for the results that we discuss below. The model features demand shocks calibrated to match the level of macroeconomic volatility prevailing before the 2008 …nancial crisis. Given that this is a period of macroeconomic stability, our benchmark calibration for the volatility of the exogenous shocks can be considered a lower bound.
Below-target in ‡ation and an overheating economy are two sides of the same coin, resolving an apparent puzzle recently observed in the U.S. data. To cope with the de ‡ationary bias, standard monetary policy rules, such as the Taylor rule, induce the central bank to keep interest rates low, even when the economy is in an expansion. This accommodative policy decreases the real interest rate and ends up overheating the economy, while in ‡ation remains below target because of expectations of future low in ‡ation. Adam and Billi (2007) and Nakov (2008) were the …rst to show that the de ‡ationary bias and the corresponding output bias arise in New Keynesian models in which the nominal interest rate is occasionally constrained by the zero lower bound. In this paper, we emphasize that the symmetry of standard monetary policy rules (e.g., the Taylor rule) plays an important role for these biases to arise and show that adopting an asymmetric rule can remove these biases. Hills et al. (2016) estimate a structural model to quantify the de ‡ationary bias and the output bias in the U.S. economy and show that the de ‡ationary bias can be as large as 40 basis for the U.S. economy. Kiley and Roberts (2017) , Mertens and Williams (2019) , and, Bernanke et al. (2019) evaluate a large varieties of monetary policy rules (including dynamic rules such as price-level-targeting rules, average-in ‡ation-rate rules, and shadow-rate rules) and conclude that dynamic rules, which make up for forgone accommodation after the ZLB episode, can eliminate the de ‡ationary biases and deliver better macroeconomic outcomes than static rules (such as the Taylor rule). In contrast, the asymmetric strategy we propose does not rely on history dependence to solve the de ‡ationary bias. Therefore, the central bank is not committed to engineer de ‡ation following a period of above-target in ‡ation. Similarly, the asymmetric strategy does not contemplate in- ‡ation overshooting; that is, a contingency in which the central bank sets the policy rate so as to engineer positive deviations of in ‡ation from its target. Mertens and Williams (2019) study a rule in which the central bank enforces an upper bound on the FFR. Compared to our proposal, this strategy has the drawback to exacerbate the problem of indeterminacy in dynamic general equilibrium models. Nakata and Schmidt (2016) show that lowering the intercept of the interest-rate rule would eliminate the de ‡ationary bias in a model calibrated to match the key features of the U.S. economy. Nakata and Schmidt (2019a) show that the de ‡ationary bias can be resolved by appointing a conservative central banker á la Rogo¤. Appointing a central banker whose in ‡ation target is slightly higher than the social optimum will also resolve the bias as shown by Seneca (2019) . Nakata and Schmidt (2019b) show that modifying the objective function of a discretionary central bank to include an interestrate smoothing mitigates the de ‡ationary bias. None of these four contributions shows the importance of asymmetric strategies to remove the de ‡ationary bias.
Our paper is related to the debate about the necessity of increasing the in ‡ation target to reduce the probability of encountering the ZLB (Coibion et al. 2012) . The main di¤erences are in the focus of the paper and in the policy prescription. First, we focus on the de ‡ationary bias and its sources. We also argue that the probability of encountering the zero lower bound is in part endogenous because of the de ‡ationary bias. While Coibion et al. (2012) , following Coibion and Gorodichenko (2011) , loglinearize the model around a positive trend in ‡ation, we solve the model with global methods. This is what allows us to derive the de ‡ationary bias. 5 Finally, our policy prescription does not involve a change in the target or price targeting or in ‡ation overshooting and thereby does not call for a radical reform of the current monetary policy framework of the Federal Reserve.
Our work is also related to the literature that aims at identifying the behavior of the natural rate of interest. Because of the di¢ culties faced by the Federal Reserve in raising in ‡ation, estimates of the natural interest rate have become central for the policy debate (Laubach and Williams 2003, and , Del Negro et al. 2017) . Our results suggest that in a low interest rate environment, estimates of the natural interest rate obtained using linear models can be biased.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a prototypical New Keynesian model to study the de ‡ationary bias. The calibration of the model to the U.S. data and its solution is discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we show that given the low long-run real interest rate, in ‡ation fails to converge to the Federal Reserve's 2-percent in ‡ation target in the long run. We also explain that average in ‡ation is lower than the central bank's target in Section 5. In Section 6, we study a simple policy proposal that aligns average in ‡ation with the desired target and show that this proposed strategy may be introduced in the aftermath of an in ‡ationary shock (opportunistic re ‡ation) or by simply cutting the rate strategically when in ‡ation is below target (strategic interest rate cut). In Section 7 we conclude.
The Model
In this section, we introduce a prototypical New Keynesian model in the tradition of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) , Woodford (2003) , and Galí (2008) augmented with a zero lower bound constraint for the nominal interest rate set by the monetary authority.
The economy consists of households, …nal goods producers, a continuum of monopolistic intermediate goods …rms, a monetary authority, and a …scal authority. Households buy and consume the …nal goods from producers, trade one-period government bonds, and supply labor to …rms. The …nal goods producers buy intermediate goods and aggregate them into a homogenous …nal good using a CES aggregation technology. The intermediate goods …rms set the price of their di¤erentiated good subject to price adjustment costs a la Rotemberg. They demand labor to produce the amount of di¤erentiated goods to be sold to households in a monopolistic competitive market. Labor is the only factor of production. The …scal authority balance its budget in every period. The monetary authority sets the interest rate for the government bonds.
The model is solved with global methods in its non-linear speci…cation.
The Representative Household In every period, the representative household chooses consumption C t , labor H t , and government bonds B t so as to maximize the expected discounted stream of utility
subject to the ‡ow budget constraint
where t = P t =P t 1 is gross in ‡ation, and the labor supply
Final Goods Producers Final goods producers transform intermediate goods into the homogeneous good, which is obtained by aggregating intermediate goods using the following technology:
where Y t (j) is the consumption of the good of the variety produced by …rm j. The price index for the aggregate homogeneous good is:
(6) and the demand for the di¤erentiated good j 2 (0; 1) is
Intermediate Goods Firms The …rm j produces output with labor as the only input
where A t denotes the total factor productivity, which follows an exogenous process. The …rm j sets the price P t (j) of its di¤erentiated goods j so as to maximize its pro…ts:
subject to the downward sloping demand curve for intermediate goods. The parameter ' > 0 measures the cost of price adjustment in units of the …nal good. The …rst order condition is
where the stochastic discount factor t;t+1 is
In equilibrium all …rms choose the same price. Thus, the New Keynesian Phillips curve is
Monetary Authority The monetary authority sets the interest rate R t responding to in ‡ation and output from their corresponding targets. The monetary authority faces a zero lower bound constraint. The policy rule reads as follows
where and Y denote the in ‡ation target which pins down the in ‡ation rate in the deterministic steady state and the natural output level, which is the level output that would arise if prices were ‡exible. The …scal authority sets taxes to balance the budget in every period
Resource Constraint The resource constraint is
Model Solution and Calibration of Parameters
We solve the model with time iterations and linear interpolation as in Richter et al. (2014) . Expectations are evaluated with Gauss-Hermite Quadrature. The state variable is the preference shock d t and the policy functions are labor N t and in ‡ation t .
We set the discount factor to 0:9975 that corresponds to an annualized real interest rate of one percent, which is in line with the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) Summary of Economic Projections (SEP). The standard deviation of preference shocks d is chosen in line with the standard deviation of the U.S. real GDP growth rate over a period ranging from the …rst quarter of 1985Q1 through the fourth quarter of 2007. This period has been characterized by record low macroeconomic volatility and therefore the calibrated value of the standard deviation of preference shocks should be regarded as low by historical standards. For instance, the standard deviation of the U.S. real GDP growth rate was twice as big in the 1970s. We will show how trend in ‡ation and the long-term real interest rate vary under di¤erent assumptions about the Post-Great Recession macroeconomic volatility. The persistence of preference shocks is set to 0:60. Higher values for this parameter prevents us from solving the model. The same problem occurs as well if one raises the variance of the shock too much. Both parameters lift the unconditional volatility of preference shocks and hence the number of future periods agents expect monetary policy to be passive because of the ZLB constraint. The remaining parameters are standard and are listed in Table 1 .
The left plot of Figure 2 shows the percentage of periods spent at the ZLB when the model is simulated for a long period of time (300,000 periods). In technical jargon, this is the ergodic probability of being constrained by the ZLB. As shown in the …gure, this probability is a¤ected by how volatile the shocks are (x-axis). The di¤erent lines are associated with di¤erent assumptions about the long-run annualized real rate of interest r = 1 . Our benchmark calibration for this parameter is one percent, which is in line with the FOMC SEP. The red stars on the lines denote the standard deviation of the shock that allows the model to match the observed volatility of real GDP growth rate Probability of Hitting the ZLB r*=2 percent r*=1.5 percent r*=1 percent Benchmark Calibration Figure 2 : The risk of the zero lower bound. Left graph: Expected frequency of the zero lower bound as the variance of preference shocks varies and for di¤erent values of the long-run real rate. The frequency is in percentage points and it is computed as the ratio between the number of periods spent at the zero lower bound and the total sample size (300,000). Right graph: Probability of hitting the zero lower bound next period conditional on being at the stochastic steady state in the current period for di¤erent values of the variance of preference shocks and of the steady-state real rate. The probability is expressed in percentage points.
during the Great Moderation and should be thereby considered as an historically-low value.
A lower long-term real interest rate raises the expected frequency of the ZLB as it shrinks the central bank's room of maneuver to counter the de ‡ationary e¤ects of recessionary shocks. We are closer to the bound on average so the central bank is expected to hit the lower bound more often. Note that the expected frequency of the ZLB grows at an increasing speed as the long-term real interest rate r falls. Furthermore, the speed is higher, the larger is the volatility of the shock. Quite clearly, the more volatile shocks are, the higher the expected frequency of the ZLB. Symmetrically, as the steady-state real rate of interest r = 1 declines, a given increase in volatility implies exponential increases in the frequency of the zero lower bound.
The graph on the right shows how likely it is for monetary policy to become constrained by the ZLB in the next period conditional on being currently at the (stochastic) steady state. As for the expected frequency of the ZLB, we study how this probability varies as we change the standard deviation of the preference shocks and the steadystate real rate of interest r . The larger the volatility of the shock, the more likely it is that the ZLB will be binding in the next period. It should be noted that the probability rises exponentially with the volatility of the shock. Lowering the long-term real rate of interest leads to similar results.
The worrying …nding highlighted by both graphs is that in a low real-interest rate environment (low r , black dashed lines) the two functions are very steep. This means that even a small increase in the volatility of the shocks can lead to substantial increases in the probability of encountering the zero lower bound. Recall that our benchmark calibration for the volatility of the preference shock is arguably very low for the U.S., given that it was chosen to match the level of volatility during the Great Moderation. The results above imply that even a small increase in the macroeconomic volatility may lead agents to believe that the ZLB constraint is a pervasive problem for monetary policy. As we shall show in the next section, these beliefs cause serious macroeconomic biases and distortions and can potentially lead to de ‡ationary spirals. These scenarios may arise for levels of macroeconomic volatility that are only slightly larger than those observed during the Great Moderation period and are way below the high levels observed in the 1970s. Symmetrically, forces that contribute to lower the natural interest rate can lead to similar outcomes for a given level of volatility.
ZLB Risk and Macroeconomic Biases
Hitting the in ‡ation target is harder for the central bank when the probability of encountering the ZLB is non-negligible. Even in tranquil times and away from the ZLB, the mere risk that monetary policy might become constrained in the future hinders the convergence of in ‡ation to the central bank's in ‡ation target (Adam and Billi 2007 and Nakov 2008) . This is because forward-looking price setters anticipate that in case of a large negative shock the central bank will be unable to fully stabilize in ‡ation due to the ZLB constraint. These beliefs cause in ‡ation expectations to become disanchored from the central bank's target and depress in ‡ation dynamics.
The existence of this in ‡ationary bias constitutes an important anomaly that should concern policymakers. Failure to acknowledge this anomaly leads the central bank to conduct an overstimulative monetary policy that ends up overheating the economy and creating more macroeconomic biases. These macroeconomic biases are broadly consistent with the recent performance of the U.S. economy. 6 Moreover, the size of these biases increases exponentially as the volatility of the macroeconomic environment rises and the natural rate of interest declines. In the subsequent sections, we will show that the symmetric approach by the central bank to in ‡ation stabilization is responsible for these biases.
To show that in ‡ation fails to converge to the central bank's target in absence of in ‡ationary shocks, it is useful to de…ne the stochastic steady-state equilibrium of the model. 7 We de…ne the in ‡ationary bias as the di¤erence between the rate of in ‡ation at the stochastic steady-state equilibrium and the central bank's in ‡ation target, which coincides with the rate of in ‡ation at the deterministic steady state. The de ‡ationary bias arises when in ‡ation at the stochastic steady state is lower than the central bank's target. A large de ‡ationary bias implies serious hurdles for the central bank to hit its in ‡ation objective.
Deterministic and stochastic steady state Both the deterministic and stochastic steady state de…ne an economy that has not been hit by shocks for a su¢ ciently long number of periods, so that their variables have stabilized around their steady state values and do not vary anymore (unless a shock suddenly hits). However, in the deterministic steady state, agents fail to appreciate the macroeconomic risk due to future realizations of the shocks. Instead, in the stochastic steady state, agents appreciate the macroeconomic risks due to future realizations of the shocks and adjust their behavior accordingly. While in a linear model these two concepts of steady-state equilibria lead to the same macroeconomic outcome, in non-linear models whether agents act in response to future macroeconomic risks matters.
Unlike the stochastic steady state equilibrium, the deterministic steady-state equilibrium of our model can be characterized analytically. The real interest rate in the deterministic steady state, r ; coincides with 1 and captures the long-run level of the real interest rate in absence of risk. Importantly, r = 1 also coincides with the deterministic steady state of the natural interest rate. The deterministic steady state of in ‡ation is pinned down by the in ‡ation target of the central bank, ; and can be effectively dealt with as a parameter. Since the price adjustment cost function takes into account the deterministic steady state in ‡ation rate, the chosen value of the in ‡ation target does not a¤ect any macroeconomic outcomes either at the deterministic steady state or away from the deterministic steady state. Thus, the deterministic steady state for output Y is purely determined by the level of TFP. Unlike the stochastic steady state, the deterministic steady state is not a¤ected by macroeconomic uncertainty, which in ‡uences the optimal behaviors of rational agents in non-linear models. Such volatility drives a wedge between the outcomes of these Figure 3 : Macroeconomic distortions due the zero lower bound as the volatility of the preference shocks varies. Left graph: The in ‡ationary bias due to model's non-linearities. The red star denotes the calibrated value of the standard deviation of this shock. The di¤erence between the blue solid line and the black dot-dashed line captures the de ‡ationary e¤ects of a risk of a recession that pushes the nominal interest rate to its lower bound. Center graph: the same as the left graph but the bias is computed with respect to output (level). Right graph: the same as the left graph but the bias is computed with respect to the real interest rate. The gray area marks the region of the values for the standard deviation of the preference we cannot solve the model for. Units: In ‡ation and real interest bias is measured in percentage points of annualized rates while the output bias and the standard deviation of the preference shocks are in percent.
two steady-state equilibria and hence fuels the in ‡ationary bias. In this section, we will show that among the many sources of non-linearity in the model (e.g., the nonlinearities that give rise to precautionary savings), the zero lower bound constraint is the main culprit behind the formation of the de ‡ationary bias and all the associated macroeconomic biases.
The De ‡ationary Bias The left graph of Figure 3 shows the di¤erence between the in ‡ation rate at the stochastic steady state and in ‡ation at the deterministic steady state with (blue solid line) and without the zero lower bound constraint (black dashdotted line). Comparing the blue solid line with the black dash-dot line allows us to isolate the e¤ects of the ZLB constraint. From the …gure, it is easy to conclude that when removing the ZLB constraint, the gap between the deterministic and stochastic steady state is quite low. Instead, the risk of hitting the zero lower bound can lead to large discrepancies between the desired and realized level of in ‡ation. The red star denotes the in ‡ationary bias that arises at the calibrated value of the standard deviation of the preference shock, which is set to match the volatility of the U.S. real GDP growth rate during the Great Moderation. Hence it can be regarded as a value lying at the low-end of the spectrum of plausible values for the U.S. economy. This …nding suggests that in absence of shocks, in ‡ation undershoots the central bank's in ‡ation target by 27 basis points because of the risk of hitting the ZLB in the future. This happens even when the macroeconomic volatility is as low as that observed during the Great Moderation. As the macroeconomic volatility increases, the bias widens up exponentially. A one-percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of shocks causes a 15-basis-points reduction in the model's longrun in ‡ation rate. This is because the curve is very steep on the right of the red star, which denotes the benchmark value for the standard deviation of preference shocks. We consider these results a reason of concern for policymakers.
For the benchmark calibration of the standard deviation of the shock, the line of the in ‡ationary bias is very steep. Consequently, it would take just a two-percentagepoint increase in the standard deviation of preference shocks to make self-ful…lling de ‡ationary spirals, which will be analyzed in greater detail below, possible. Given that our benchmark calibration re ‡ects a record-low macroeconomic volatility, this result is a reason for concern. As we shall show, this …nding is driven by the low long-term real interest rate r , which is at an historical low according to the Survey of Economic Projections (SEP). A higher long-term real rate of interest r makes the function of the in ‡ationary bias less steep and therefore would increase the threshold of the volatility that triggers the de ‡ationary spirals.
It should also be noted that the steepness of the function of the long-term in ‡ationary bias has to be chie ‡y imputed to the presence of the ZLB constraint. Indeed, the slope of the black dashed dotted line, which capture the counterfactual case where the ZLB constraint is not enforced and nominal rates are allowed to become negative, is tiny and constant for di¤erent values of the standard deviation of the shocks.
What if the central bank realizes that in ‡ation is in general below the desired target and decides to lower its in ‡ation target to make it coincide with average in ‡ation? The long-run de ‡ationary bias induced by the ZLB constraint would become even larger because lowering the target would make the probability of encountering the zero lower bound even larger. We discuss below what the central bank can do to bring in ‡ation in line with the desired target.
The Real Interest Rate Bias The right graph of Figure 3 shows the bias on the real interest rate due to the zero lower bound. This negative bias emerges because the central bank is conducting an active monetary policy with the objective of closing the negative in ‡ation gap, which is shown in the graph on the left. As in ‡ation is persistently below target, so is the real interest rate. This result is quite important. It shows that for a given level of the deterministic steady state of the natural interest rate r ; the risk of encountering the zero lower bound can lead to a substantial decline in the stochastic steady state for the real interest rate. Thus, if an econometrician were to use a moving average or the trend component of the real interest rate to back out r ; she would reach the conclusion that r is in fact lower than what really is. Estimates of the natural interest rate have become central for the policy debate (Laubach and Williams 2003 and Del Negro et al. 2017) . Our results suggest that when the zero lower bound risk is relevant, estimates of the natural rate of interest obtained using linear models can be biased. We consider this an interesting direction for further research.
To sum up, the in ‡ationary bias brought about the presence of the ZLB can generate …rst-order distortion for a central bank that tries to stabilize in ‡ation around the target. Furthermore, we noticed that the combination of low real rate of interests, r , and moderate macroeconomic risk can trigger the long-run bias in in ‡ation and output or even worse de ‡ationary spirals.
The Output Bias The center graph shows the e¤ects of the risk of hitting the ZLB on long-run output. As before, the long-term output bias due to the zero lower bound is given by the vertical di¤erence between the blue solid line and solid dashed-dot line, which gives us the bias when the non-negativity constraint on the nominal interest rate is not imposed. The reason why the output bias is positive is because the central bank has a two percent in ‡ation target but in ‡ation ‡uctuates around its stochastic steady state that is lower than the central bank's target (see the left graph of Figure 3 ). As a result the central bank keeps the interest rate lower than its deterministic steady-state level to close the negative in ‡ation gap. This can be seen in the right graph of Figure  3 . This monetary stimulus drives a positive wedge between the level of output at the stochastic steady state and that at the deterministic steady state.
It should be noted that if we relax the ZLB constraint, the other non-linearities in the model would imply a level of output lower than the deterministic steady state value. The di¤erence between the two would be increasing in the volatility of the shock. In absence of the ZLB constraint, the long-run in ‡ationary bias becomes tiny (see graph on the left) and therefore the central bank will respond to this by lowering the interest rate only by a little. Moreover, in this case precautionary motives, which prompt households to save more to shelter themselves against future risks, become the Figure 4 : Macroeconomic distortions due the zero lower bound as the long-real real rate of interest varies. Left graph:
The in ‡ationary bias due to model's non-linearities. The red star denotes the calibrated value of the standard deviation of this shock. The di¤erence between the blue solid line and the black dot-dashed line captures the de ‡ationary e¤ects of a risk of a recession that pushes the nominal interest rate to its lower bound. Center graph: the same as the left graph but the bias is computed with respect to output (level). Right graph: the same as the left graph but the bias is computed with respect to the real interest rate. The gray area marks the region of the values for the standard deviation of the preference we cannot solve the model for. Units: In ‡ation and real interest bias is measured in percentage points of annualized rates while the output bias and the standard deviation of the preference shocks are in percent.
driver of the negative long-term output bias. The positive bias introduced by the lower bound constraint dominates these e¤ects for our benchmark calibration of the standard deviation of preference shocks (red star). As we shall see, if the long-term real interest rate r is higher, the ZLB bias on long-term output would be dominated by the e¤ects of the other non-linearities in the model. This is because a higher real rate of interest expands the central bank's room of maneuver in case of negative preference shocks. Consequently, de ‡ationary spirals are less likely.
De ‡ationary Spirals The gray areas in Figure 3 denote the region of values of the standard deviation of preference shocks for which the zero lower bound constraint sparks self-ful…lling de ‡ationary spirals. The mechanism goes as follows. As in ‡ation expectations fall, current in ‡ation tends to fall because of the Phillips curve. If monetary policy is not constrained by the zero lower bound, the central bank can effectively counteract these de ‡ationary pressures so as to make them not supported in equilibrium. When monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB, the central bank has a limited capability of lowering the nominal rate if needed to stabilize prices. This limitation sets the stage for self-ful…lling de ‡ationary spirals. When preference shocks become excessively volatile, the probability of hitting the ZLB increases and so does the probability that these de ‡ationary spiral are supported in equilibrium. Figure 5 : Macroeconomic distortions due the zero lower bound as the standard deviation of preference shocks varies (x-axis) and for alternative values of the steady-state real rate of interest. Left graph: The in ‡ationary bias due to the zero lower bound constraint. The red star denotes the calibrated value of the standard deviation of this shock. Center graph: the same as the left graph but the bias is computed with respect to output (level). Right graph: the same as the left graph but the bias is computed with respect to the real interest rate. Units: In ‡ation and real interest bias is measured in percentage points of annualized rates while the output bias and the standard deviation of the preference shocks are in percent.
Implications of a Low Natural Real Interest Rate
The results we have discussed so far rely on the assumption that the long-run natural rate of interest is equal to one percent. This seems to be close to the current consensus of policymakers. In this section, we show that the in ‡ationary bias is triggered by the combination of a low interest rates environment and the presence of the zero lower bound that can constrain the central bank's ability of countering the de ‡ationary e¤ects of shocks. In fact, higher values of the real rate of interest would mitigate or even completely eliminate the bias on in ‡ation and the real interest rate because it would be less likely that monetary policy will become constrained by the ZLB. Figure 4 precisely illustrates these results. A long-term real rate of interest r equal to 3 percent or higher e¤ectively zeroes the bias on in ‡ation and that on the real interest rate due to the risk of hitting the ZLB in the future. The intuition is straightforward: when the long-term real interest rate is higher the central bank has more room to counteract the de ‡ationary e¤ects of a contractionary shock and hence is less likely to become constrained by the zero lower bound (see Figure 2 ). Nevertheless, a slightly lower real interest rate r than that of our benchmark calibration can lead to de ‡ationary spirals (the gray area). In such an unfavorable state of the world, the central bank loses control over in ‡ation expectations because the expected probability of hitting the ZLB is so large that de ‡ationary spirals can arise.
It is worth emphasizing that the size of the bias due to non-linearities in the model other than the ZLB does not vary with the long-term real interest rate, suggesting that the long-term macroeconomic biases linked to a low-interest-rate environment is entirely due to one speci…c source of non-linearity in the New Keynesian model: the zero lower bound. Furthermore, the other non-linearities imply a small negative bias for both in ‡ation, and output, as well as the real interest rate: -0.5 bps, -1.2 bps, -1.7 bps, respectively. Figure 5 shows the e¤ects of changing both the standard deviation of shocks and the long-term real rate of interest r . The important takeaway from this graph is that as the long-term real interest rate r increases su¢ ciently, the long-term in ‡ation and output biases disappear. Moreover, a higher real rate of interest r would make the function of the in ‡ationary bias less steep and therefore would increase the threshold of the volatility of shocks that triggers the de ‡ationary spirals.
It is also interesting to notice that an increase in the long-term real rate of interest of one percentage point more than halves the in ‡ationary bias due to the ZLB constraint. This gain increases with the size of the macroeconomic volatility, which is captured by the volatility of the preference shocks (x-axis).
The Unconditional Bias
The previous section has shown that even when the economy is at the stochastic steady and thus away from the zero lower bound, a de ‡ationary bias arises because of the risk of encountering the zero lower bound in the future. This, in turn, triggers a bias in the real interest, as the central bank tries to lift in ‡ation closer to the target and drives a wedge between actual output and optimal output Y . In this section, we go one step further and show that the in ‡ationary bias is even larger when focusing on average in ‡ation as opposed to the stochastic steady state.
To show this result, we de…ne the unconditional de ‡ationary bias as the di¤erence between the model's unconditional mean of in ‡ation and in ‡ation at the deterministic steady-state equilibrium, which coincides with the central bank's in ‡ation target . This alternative concept of de ‡ationary bias can be observed more directly in the data and is indeed more closely related to the bias shown in Figure 1 than the one used in the previous section.
Both de…nitions of in ‡ation bias are useful. For instance, the de…nition based on the stochastic steady state allowed us to assess the extent to which the ZLB risk hinders the central bank's ability to close the in ‡ation and output gaps away from the ZLB. Furthermore, the fact that in ‡ation is subdued at the stochastic steady state allows us to clarify the following important result: When our model predicts that in ‡ation is on average below the central bank's target, this result is not mechanically driven by the periods actually spent at the ZLB. Rather, this result re ‡ects the distortions imposed by the existence of the ZLB on in ‡ation dynamics, which were discussed in the previous section.
Recall, that the stochastic steady state corresponds to a situation in which the economy has not been hit by any shock for a long time, but agents are aware of risk. In a linear model, the stochastic steady state values would coincide with the unconditional means of the corresponding variables, but this is not the case in a nonlinear environment. Thus, we simulate the model for several periods and then compute the mean of the variables of interest. In this setting, the risk of encountering the zero lower bound is in fact materialized. Figure 6 reports the average bias as the volatility of the preference shock varies. The bias is computed by taking the mean of in ‡ation, output, and the real interest based on a simulation lasting 1,000,000 periods. We drop the …rst 100,000 observations to minimize the e¤ects of initial conditions. The biases are reported on the same scale used in Figure 3 . The de ‡ationary bias is now even larger. The zero lower bound is not a mere possibility, but an event that is in fact realized. Thus, average in ‡ation is even further away from the desired in ‡ation target because the economy experiences the very low in ‡ation associated with the zero lower bound period.
This pattern for the behavior of in ‡ation seems consistent with what is reported in Figure 1 . In the late 1990s, the conquest of US in ‡ation was completed. The central bank was successful in convincing agents about the 2% in ‡ation target. In terms of the model, this event can be captured as convergence toward the stochastic steady state associated with a 2% in ‡ation target. Such a low target, combined with a low real natural interest rate environment leads to a negative in ‡ationary bias, even if the zero lower bound is not binding, and in ‡ation drifts below the desired 2% target. In fact, during those years the Federal Reserve was genuinely concerned about the risk of de ‡ation (Krugman 2003) . With the 2008 recession, the ZLB risk materialized. The model predicts in this case a further reduction in in ‡ation, as in the data. Finally, as the economy recovers, the model predicts that in ‡ation would not move to a 2% target, but it stabilizes around a lower value corresponding to the stochastic steady state.
When it comes to the behavior of output and the real interest rate, the bias is Figure 6 : Average bias as the volatility of the preference shock varies. The bias is computed by taking the mean of in ‡ation, output, and the real interest based on a simulation lasting 1,000,000 periods. We drop the …rst 100,000 observations to minimize the e¤ects of initial conditions. The biases are reported on the same scale used in Figure 3 . largely gone. When looking at the average bias for the real interest rate, there is a countere¤ect that pushes the bias to be positive. This countere¤ect is brought about by the presence of the ZLB itself that truncates the left tail of the distribution of the nominal interest rate. Thus, the negative bias that arises away from the zero lower bound is compensated by the fact that at the zero lower bound the central bank cannot further lower the interest rate, making the e¤ective real interest rate too high. Importantly, the two phenomena are just the two sides of the same coin: The negative bias away from the zero lower bound is generated by the de ‡ationary pressure that arises exactly because at the zero lower bound the central bank is not able to lower the interest rate to mitigate the fall in in ‡ation.
The Asymmetric Rule
We have shown that the de ‡ationary bias induced by the zero lower bound is reduced when the natural interest rate r increases or the macroeconomic volatility is lower. We now turn our attention to what the central bank can do to address the de ‡ationary bias.
The Policy Proposal
In the literature and in policy circles, there has been an ample discussion about the possibility of increasing the in ‡ation target as a way to avoid the perils of the zero lower bound (Coibion et al. 2012 ). An increase in the target would reduce the possibility of hitting the zero lower bound and the associated bias, as shown by Nakata and Schmidt (2016) . However, policymakers have been quite reluctant to follow this path. Arguments that have been proposed against this solution are the loss of reputation and the fact that higher in ‡ation seems to be associated with more volatile in ‡ation. Another line of research has proposed price or nominal GDP targeting and averagein ‡ation targeting (Mertens and Williams 2019) . However, such policies are perceived as risky because they may require the central bank to engineer a de ‡ation over certain periods of time in order to bring the price level down.
In this paper, we are advocating a di¤erent approach that does not require the central bank to explicitly aim at hitting a time-varying in ‡ation target. The central bank can commit to react less aggressively to positive deviations of in ‡ation from target than to negative deviations. We will show that embracing this asymmetric strategy can e¤ectively remove the macroeconomic biases.
The policy rule that we propose implies a smaller response to in ‡ation when in- ‡ation is above target. Such an asymmetric policy rule takes into account the risk of encountering the zero lower bound when in ‡ation is below target by tolerating longer periods of in ‡ation above target. Speci…cally, we consider the following modi…ed policy rule:
where denotes the response of in ‡ation when in ‡ation is below target, stands for the response to in ‡ation when in ‡ation is above target, and 1 t< is an indicator function that is equal to one when in ‡ation is below target ( t < ). In what follows, we set = 2 as in the benchmark calibration of Section 3 and study how the average and stochastic steady state biases vary in response to changes in .
The asymmetric rule in equation (16) can be interpreted as a strategy according to which the central bank promises to be slower in raising the rates when in ‡ation goes above target. This rule reduces the risk of the zero lower bound and its e¤ects. It is therefore particularly e¤ective in a low-interest rate environment, like the current one, in which the biases on key macroeconomic variables can be sizable. Figure 7 shows how the macroeconomic distortions due to the zero lower bound varies as the central bank promises to be less aggressive when in ‡ation is above its target. As before, we examine the behavior of the bias away from the zero lower bound (stochastic steady state, blue solid line) and its mean (black dashed line). The red Figure 7 : Macroeconomic biases due to ZLB as the central bank varies its response to positive deviations of in ‡ation from target. The in ‡ation bias (left plot), the output bias (center plot), and the real interest rate bias (the right plot) are computed by taking the di¤erence between these variables at the stochastic steady state and their value at the deterministic steady state (blue solid line). These biases are also computed as the di¤erence between the average value of these three variables and their value at the deterministic steady state (red dashed-dotted line). The response when in ‡ation is below target is always equal to 2 as in the benchmark calibration. The red star marks the symmetric case in which the central bank responds with equal strength to in ‡ation or de ‡ation. Units: The in ‡ation and the real interest rate biases are expressed in annualized percentage points and the output gap in percentage points.
stars denote the distortion under a symmetric rule with a response to in ‡ation equal to two, as in the benchmark calibration. We observe that being less aggressive when in ‡ation is above target helps mitigate all the three biases. Speci…cally, for a response around 1.5, the ZLB-driven macroeconomic distortions become negligible. In a nutshell, to remove the macroeconomic distortions due to the ZLB constraint, policymakers need to be willing to tolerate in- ‡ation above the target for longer periods of time. By raising in ‡ation expectations and removing de ‡ationary bias, the asymmetric rule also makes de ‡ationary spirals less likely to happen. This important result manifests itself with smaller gray areas in Figures 3 and 4 . This is an important point to which we will return in Section 6.3. It is worth emphasizing that this policy does not simply remove the bias by taking the average of high and low in ‡ation. Instead, it e¤ectively reduces the probability of hitting the ZLB. This is obvious when the bias is measured as the distance between the in ‡ation target (deterministic steady state) and the stochastic steady state of in ‡ation. As explained above, in this case, the economy is always away from the zero lower bound. The reduction in the bias is therefore a result of a lower risk of hitting the zero lower bound in the future.
To further elaborate on this last point, we simulate the economy under a sequence of negative shocks large enough to bring the economy to the zero lower bound. Three cases are considered: (1) The benchmark model with the zero lower bound (solid blue The economy is at its stochastic steady state in period 0, 1, and 2. From period 3 until period 8, the economy is hit by a one-standard-deviation negative preference shock in every period. Starting from period 9 no more shocks occur and the economy evolves back to its stochastic steady state. These simulations are shown under three cases: (1) The benchmark model with the ZLB constraint (blue solid line); (2) the benchmark model in which the ZLB constraint is not imposed, allowing negative nominal interest rates model (red dashed line);
(3) the model with the asymmetric policy rule that allows the central bank to remove the de ‡ationary bias by responding less aggressively to positive deviations of in ‡ation from target (red dashed-dotted line). Units: In ‡ation and interest rates are measured in percentage points of annualized rates while the output gap is expressed in percent. line); (2) the same model without imposing the zero lower bound constraint (dashed line);
(3) the model with the asymmetric policy rule that allows the central bank to remove the macroeconomic biases (dotted line). Figure 8 reports the path for the endogenous variables in the three cases. We assume that the economies are initially at their corresponding stochastic steady states and the size of the each shock is one standard deviation. In period 3, a sequence of negative demand shocks hits the economy. Starting from period 9 no more shocks occur and the preference shock slowly goes back to its own steady state. Before the sequence of negative shocks occurs, the economies are at their stochastic steady state and the three lines are horizontal. The distance of these lines from the deterministic steady state, which is denoted by the black dotted horizontal line, exactly captures the macroeconomic biases, which are also shown in Figure 7 . Furthermore, we Welfare is evalutated at the stochastic steady state and reported on the left axis. The in ‡ation bias is de…ned as the di¤erence between the annualized percentage rate of in ‡ation at the stochastic steady state and the annualized percentage rate of in ‡ation at the deterministic steady state and is reported on the right axis.
can see that in ‡ation under the asymmetric rule is quite similar to the level of in ‡ation that would prevail in the counterfactual economy that does not impose the zero lower bound constraint. In line with the results presented above, when the asymmetric rule is implemented, the de ‡ationary pressure coming from the possibility of entering the zero lower bound is compensated by the in ‡ationary pressure stemming from the fact that the central bank is willing to accept more prolonged periods of in ‡ation above the target. As the sequence of negative shocks starts hitting the economy, the bene…cial e¤ects of the asymmetric rule relative to the symmetric rule are shown in Figure 8 . In ‡ation falls by less and recovers more quickly. Consistently with such path, the time spent at the zero lower bound is reduced. Importantly, Figure 8 illustrates that the asymmetric strategy removes the de ‡ationary bias and, at the same time, does not lead in ‡ation to overshoot the central bank's target after the ZLB period as the adoption of makeup strategies (e.g., the Krugmann-Eggertsson-Woodford "lower-for-longer" policies) would entail. In this respect, our proposal calls for a much less radical reform of the current U.S. monetary policy framework.
Welfare Analysis
We evaluate the appeal of the asymmetric rule by measuring its impact on households' welfare W 0 , which reads as follows: Figure 9 shows welfare W t (left axis) and the in ‡ationary bias (right axis). As the central bank deviates from the symmetric rule (the red star) by lowering the response to above-target in ‡ation, welfare increases. When this response is around 1.6, the welfare peaks and then it declines as the response to positive in ‡ation deviations from target is further decreased. It should be noticed that to close the in ‡ationary bias, the central bank has to respond more weakly to in ‡ation than optimal. The asymmetric rule that removes the de ‡ationary bias completely, is suboptimal in that it allows too large and persistent positive deviations of in ‡ation from the central bank's target. The optimal asymmetric rule solves the following trade-o¤. On the one hand, by tolerating some persistent positive deviations of in ‡ation from its target the central bank manages to mitigate the de ‡ationary bias. On the other hand, by responding strongly to positive deviations of in ‡ation from its target the central bank retains the necessary commitment to rule out episodes of high in ‡ation.
Announcing that the central bank will respond less aggressively to in ‡ation when in ‡ation will be above target is time inconsistent if this announcement is made when in ‡ation is below target. Therefore, the central bank needs an opportunity to show the public its commitment to the new asymmetric rule. The arrival of an in ‡ationary shock that pushes in ‡ation above target is such an opportunity. We call this scenario opportunistic re ‡ation. We now investigate the implications for welfare and the macroeconomic outcomes of a central bank pursuing an opportunistic re ‡ation.
Opportunistic Re ‡ation Let us assume that the economy is initially at the stochastic steady state associated with the symmetric rule when it gets hit by a positive preference shock that boosts consumption and aggregate demand. The central bank receives now the opportunity to show to the private sector that it is willing to commit to the optimal asymmetric rule by responding less aggressively to the in ‡ation consequences of that shock. It is assumed that by observing the muted response to in ‡ation, the private sector immediately believes that the central bank will follow the 
Inflation Gap
Asymmetric Rule Symmetric Rule Figure 10 : The dynamics of welfare, the output gap, and the in ‡ation gap after a two-standard-deviation positive preference shock hits the economy in period 1. Two cases are reported: the case in which the central bank adopts the optimal asymmetric rule and conducts an opportunistic re ‡ation of the economy and the case in which the central bank does not take this opportunity and sticks to the symmetric rule. In both cases, the economy is initialized at its stochastic steady state. Units: In ‡ation gap is measured in percentage points of annualized rates while the output bias is expressed in percentage points.
asymmetric rule forever.
In Figure 10 , we show the impulse response function of welfare and the macroeconomic gaps (in ‡ation and output) to a two standard deviation positive preference shock under the symmetric rule and under the optimal asymmetric rule. The output gap is measured in deviations from the ‡exible price economy whereas the in ‡ation gap is expressed in deviations from the central bank's two-percent target. The optimal asymmetric rule raises the output and in ‡ation gaps in the short run relative to the symmetric rule whereas it mitigates the macroeconomic gaps in the longer run (10 quarters out). Welfare is reported in the left graph of Figure 10 , which shows that the optimal asymmetric rule unambiguously raises welfare both in the short run and in the longer run.
Why is welfare higher in every period when the central bank adopts the asymmetric rule even though this rule causes output and in ‡ation gaps to widen more at the beginning? In every period, welfare does not depend only on the current in ‡ation and output gaps but it is also a¤ected by the expected discounted stream of welfare gains that will be accrued over time. The short-term responses of social welfare to a twostandard-deviation positive preference shock implies that the long-term welfare gains associated with the mitigation of the macroeconomic biases outweigh the short-term welfare losses. 8 Size of the Inflationary Shock Size of the Inflationary Shock Welfare gains/losses are computed as the di¤erence between the welfare associated with adopting the optimal asymmetric rule and the welfare associated with sticking to the benchmark symmetric rule in the period when the in ‡ationary shock hits the economy.
The opportunistic re ‡ation involves a trade-o¤ between short-term and long-term macroeconomic stabilization. Hence, a myopic central bank may refrain from seizing this opportunity as welfare costs are front-loaded. 9 To further investigate this issue, we tweak the welfare function (17) to study the behaviors of a myopic central banker who only cares about the welfare gains accrued up to a …nite time horizon k. The welfare of the myopic central banker is denoted by f W k 0 , which is de…ned as follows:
The left plot of Figure 11 shows the myopic central bank's welfare gains from carrying out an opportunistic re ‡ation following a positive preference shock as the size of the shock varies. The gains are computed by comparing the welfare under the optimal asymmetric rule for the non-myopic/benevolent central banker and that under the symmetric rule at the time the in ‡ationary shock hits the economy. The di¤erent lines are associated with four degrees of the central banker's myopia, which is captured by the relevant horizons k = 1; 4; 8; and 12 quarters. The shorter the horizon k is, the more myopic the central banker is. The gains are shown as a function of the size of the shock. The myopic central banker's gains decline as the size of the preference shocks increases and, hence, the short-run response of in ‡ation to the shock is more pronounced. The speed of this decline increases as the myopia of the central banker becomes less severe. If the relevant horizon is less or equal than one year (k < 4), gains are negative for all positive shock sizes. Such high levels of myopia dissuade the central bank from seizing the opportunity of re ‡ating the economy as the policymaker is more allured by the short-run welfare gains, which stem from mitigating the immediate in ‡ationary consequences of the shock. If the myopic central bank has a horizon of two years, it will opportunistically re ‡ate the economy if the standard deviation of preference shocks is lower than two. Lower degree of myopia (higher k) leads the central bank to carry out the opportunistic re ‡ation even when the magnitude of the shock is very large and the likely short-run in ‡ationary consequences of the shock are considerable.
Going back to the case of the non-myopic/benevolent central banker (k ! 1), the right plot of Figure 11 shows the welfare gains from opportunistic re ‡ation in this case as the size of the positive preference shock varies. The optimal asymmetric rule dominates the symmetric rule if the size of the shock is less than 5 times the calibrated standard deviations of the shocks (i.e., 100 d = 1:175). We consider this value as fairly high, which suggests that opportunistic re ‡ation increases the economy's welfare by removing the de ‡ationary bias.
Strategic Interest Rate Cuts
We showed that if the central bank seizes the opportunity of re ‡ating the economy by adopting an asymmetric rule after an in ‡ationary shock arises, social welfare generally increases. If no opportunity to re ‡ating the economy arises, the central bank can still remove the in ‡ationary bias and improves welfare by cutting more aggressively the interest rate if in ‡ation is below target while clarifying that the response to in ‡ation above target is unchanged.
This alternative asymmetric rule also eliminates the macroeconomic biases. The upper panels of Figure 12 report the behavior of the macroeconomic biases de…ned with respect to the stochastic steady state (blue solid lines) and the observable averages (red dashed lines) as the response to below-target in ‡ation, , varies. The response to positive deviations of in ‡ation from the target is the same as in the symmetric rule ( = 2). The red star denotes the distortions under a symmetric rule ( = = 2) as in the baseline calibration. The response to in ‡ation below target that zeroes the biases is approximately three.
The e¤ects of adopting this asymmetric rule on the probability of hitting the ZLB Probability of Hitting the ZLB Figure 12 : Macroeconomic biases due to risk of hitting ZLB under the asymmetric rule. The biases are computed relatively to the stochastic steady state (blue solid line) or the average in ‡ation (red dashed-dotted line) and are shown in the upper panels. The output gap is expressed in percentage points and in ‡ation gap is expressed in percentage points of annualized rates. The lower panels show the risk of hitting the ZLB in the next period (left) and the expected frequency of the ZLB (right) as the response to in ‡ation below target varies. The frequency is in percentage points and it is computed as the ratio between the number of periods spent at the zero lower bound and the total sample size (300,000). The probability of hitting the zero lower bound in the next period is conditional on being at the stochastic steady state in the current period and is expressed in percentage points. and the frequency of ZLB episodes is ambiguous ex ante. On the one hand, lowering more vigorously the nominal interest rate to …ght against de ‡ationary pressures could increase the probability of hitting the zero lower bound. On the other hand, committing to respond more aggressively to negative deviations of in ‡ation from target eliminates the de ‡ationary bias and thereby raises the long-term nominal interest rate. Higher nominal rates cause the likelihood of hitting the ZLB to fall. As shown in the lower panels of Figure 12 , the asymmetric rule that allows the central bank to remove the macroeconomic bias ( = 3) lowers the probability of hitting the ZLB and the expected frequency of ZLB episodes. Figure 13 : Asymmetric Rule and De ‡ationary Spirals. Upper left plot: the values of the standard deviation of preference shocks above which de ‡ationary spirals arise as the above-target response to in ‡ation varies and the below-target response is set to be equal to 2.0. Upper right plot: the value of the standard deviation of preference shocks above which de ‡ationary spirals arise as the below-target response to in ‡ation varies and the above-target response is set to be equal to 2.0. Lower left plot: the values of the real long-term interest rate below which de ‡ationary spirals arise as the above-target response to in ‡ation varies and the below-target response is set to be equal to 2.0. Lower right plot: the values of the real long-term interest rate below which de ‡ationary spirals arise as the below-target response to in ‡ation varies and the above-target response is set to be equal to 2.0. The red stars mark the the thresholds for the standard deviation of the preference shock and for the real interest rate under the benchmark calibration (symmetric rule).
Asymmetric Rules and De ‡ationary Spirals
As already discussed in Section 4, adopting an asymmetric rule does not remove only the de ‡ationary bias but it also lowers the risk for the economy to experience self-ful…lling de ‡ationary spirals. While welfare is not directly a¤ected by this risk since in our model parameters are …xed, falling into a self-ful…lling de ‡ationary spirals may be very costly for the economy. The gray areas in Figure 13 denote the values of the standard deviation of preference shocks (upper panels) and the values of the longterm real interest rate (lower panels) that trigger the de ‡ationary spirals for any given above-target response to in ‡ation (left panels) and for any given below-target response to in ‡ation (right panels). The bigger the asymmetry in the parameters of the rule, the bigger (smaller) the macroeconomic uncertainty (the real rate of interest) has to be to trigger self-ful…lling de ‡ationary spirals. This is because asymmetric rules make the risk of encountering the ZLB lower and hence diminish the likelihood and the expected duration of passive monetary policies in the future. Mertens and Williams (2019) . study a rule according to which the Federal Reserve enforces an upper bound on the federal funds rate to resolve the de ‡ationary bias. This rule, while correcting the bias, would imply an increase in the probability of self-ful…lling in ‡ationary spirals because e¤ectively monetary policy becomes passive when in ‡ation goes above a certain level. Therefore, such a rule reduces the risk of de ‡ationary spirals at the cost of increasing the risk of triggering in ‡ationary spirals. Instead, our asymmetric rule always implies active responses to in ‡ation deviations from the target and hence does not expose the economy to the risk of indeterminately large increases in in ‡ation.
Conclusions
An environment in which monetary policy faces the risk of encountering the zero lower bound, in ‡ation tends to remain persistently below target, even if monetary policy is not constrained. This is because agents anticipate the possibility of low in ‡ation in the future. We showed an asymmetric policy strategy that allows more prolonged spell of in ‡ation above target eliminates the macroeconomic biases due to the ZLB. A strategy according to which the central bank reacts less aggressively to positive deviations of in ‡ation from target than to negative deviations can e¤ectively remove the macroeconomic biases, improve social welfare, and reduce the risk for the economy to fall into highly costly self-ful…lling de ‡ationary spirals.
We argue that convincing agents that the central bank will abandon the old symmetric strategy to embrace the asymmetric one is non-trivial when in ‡ation is below target. Once the central bank has removed the bias by announcing the asymmetric strategy, it has an incentive to renege on its announcement and to stick to the symmetric rule, which lowers the volatility of in ‡ation. A way to address this time inconsistency is to conduct an opportunistic re ‡ation; that is, to wait for an in ‡ationary shock that will give the central bank the opportunity to show the public that its response to higher than target in ‡ation is muted.
We show that carrying out an opportunistic re ‡ation is welfare improving in a standard New Keynesian model. Nevertheless, the welfare gains are back-loaded and hence the policymaker needs to be su¢ ciently forward looking to be willing to conduct an opportunistic re ‡ation.
If no opportunity to rein ‡ate the economy occurs and in ‡ation keeps staying below target, the central bank can cut the rate more aggressively. This action shows to the public that the central bank has credibly adopted an asymmetric rule according to which the policy rate will be adjusted more aggressively when in ‡ation is below target while the central bank keeps its anti-in ‡ation attitude unchanged when in ‡ation is above target. This second asymmetric strategy is shown to be able to remove the macroeconomic biases as well and lowers the probability of hitting the ZLB.
3. Solve for all time t variables for a given state vector d t . The policy variables are:
so that the remaining variables are given as:
Calculate the state variable for period t + 1 at each integration node i:
where the superscript i indicates the variable at integration node i. For each integration node i;d t+1 , calculate the policy variables and solve for output and consumption: i t+1 =g 1 ( i;d t )
Calculate the errors for the Euler Equation and the New Keynesian Phillips curve
where the expectations are numerically integrated across the integration nodes. The nodes and weights are based on Gaussian-Hermite quadrature.
4. Use a numerical root …nder to minimize the errors for the equations. The policy function of period t is adjusted, while the policy functions for the next period t + 1 are …xed.
5. Update the policy functions until the errors at each point of the discretized state are su¢ ciently small.
